United Nations Anti-Terrorist Coalition

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Unite With India against terrorism

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I call upon the world community--barring differences in religion and boundary/political issues--to unitedly fight with the Indian Armed Forces and allied agencies against the menace of terrorism and wipe it out from the face of the earth.I requisition intelligence on the operating terrorist groups in SE Asia and South Asia from competent agencies--ofcourse in open-source form--so that I may forward the info. to the concerned agencies in India.I have dedicated myself to the noble cause of eradication of terrorism(however infinitesimal my contribution may be) and I solemnly pledge to uphold the highest ethical standards as taught to me by my Late father:Captain D.N.Mazumdar
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Blogger keshav mazumdar said...

Dr. Bono's Lateral Thinking applied to MI

Military Intelligence encompassess an extremely diverse field of theories/applications.It's an applied science/applied psychology and applied Gray-matter? Yes-applied Graymatter theory and applications.To put it more precisely the latter is the parent of the former two[and ofcourse several other interrelated factors].Atleast that is what my experience says.Atleast that is what the theories and very effectively proved applications of Dr. Edward dE Bono project. It is Dr. Bono's innumerable lectures/work's around the globe and in leading conglomerates/corporations/Universities/even school curricula that has projected him as the MASTERTHINKER OF THE DECADE.So much so that [as i possess a very analytical mind] when I went out to test the theories outlined in one of his very first publications, I was immediately immpresed and the ensuing interest propelled me to apply his business ideas/actions to intelligence scenarious , ofcourse on a small scale[ the first being the case of graft charges against a senior officer]. My task's were essentially independent/of voluntary nature--ofcourse not relegated as ' source'/ temporary field agent: I took my own decisions and decided the format of dissemination.I acheived remarkable success with Dr. Bono's applied thinking tool's merely configured for army intelligenceAcquisition/Analysis/Acceptance.As I gradually build up this site, I will produce before you-my esteemed audience-these very tools in all their originality and do sincerely hope that other allied agencies also implement these concepts -ofcourse after validating my statements.

Please refer to Dr. Bono's texts for the revolutionary concept of 'Lateral Thinking'.

3:54 AM  
Blogger keshav mazumdar said...

Perceptual tools for Military Intelligence-a case study

Perceptual Tools

A case of graft charges-year 1992

This work is based on the findings during my near decade association with the MI units, of course on a voluntary and independent basis. I am fortunate enough that a section of officers in the Command/units and the MI Dte. (AHQ) extended their full support in using my congnitive faculties to execute Int. analysis. In the years to follow I have built up an acumen for Int. tasks, whether be it for the services of the ECLU or the IFSU.
The complete credit to my cognitive tools creation should go to Dr. Edward dE Bono on whose writigs I have based the research.Yes-I do not desire to make false claims to what is an essential byproduct of Dr. Bonos work , merely applied to military intelligence.In certain parts of this paper I have given excerts from his texts as they are very conveniently worded for the layman to comprehend.
The Int. officer at successive staff levels is mainly concerned with gathering, analysing and disseminating information of use to the command and to the echelon above and below it. His focus is on enemy or, in time of piece, on foreign forces & insurgents in general.
The operation officer is the staff agent who literally operates the forces of the command. Using int. reports of the enemy sitution as presented to him by the Int. officer, he designs forces and courses of action to protect the command and accomplish its mission. The commander either approves of the of those courses of action or designs one of a different interpretation on the Int. estimate given to him by the intelligence officer.
“ Design” an appropriate course of action. “Design” the intelligence estimate to fit in priorities.
“ Design” a perceptual framework for Int. interpretation. “Design” and not just analysis. We ought to give equal weight to the design of ideas and all points. Plans have to be designed. Surveillance should be executed in the design mode. Reactions have to be designed. You have to predesign reaction posibilities. You have to conceive in advance opportunities which will determine approprite action. So instead of assuming that analysis reveals a map with readymade roads upon it, we should assume that the map shows only the terrain and we have to “design” the roads. Too often we think only of “analysis” in finding alternatives. This can be done by shifting the boundaries of the situation, by introducing new factors, by involving others etc. The uncertainties in open-ended problems demand flexible designs and changes in direction.
So much for design. I have designed the perceptual tools keeping the above factors and a host of others in my mind. Till now, thinking is regarded only as a tool for assimilating information, classifying it and putting it into its proper place. This is definitely not analysis & collation in the true sense of the world. In fact within a closed problem area, information may indeed seem to replace thinking. It is a common experience in the Int. world to find officers who are so well informed within their own speciality, however, their ability is much less, for information may no longer be a substitute for thinking.
Always to getting information is admirable, but to await perfect information is impractical . Quick decisions and actions have to be taken, and since the information is usually imperfect [like that of ZRO cases] it has to be supplemented by good thinking.
Take a case where it is possible to collect a great deal of information. As such it is often felt that this collection is more important than thinking . It is supposed that eventually enough information will have been collected for an interpretation/idea to emerge. This is a major fallacy in the thinking of most int. operatives. Actually an officer looking in a differnt way at information that already exists can come up with new concepts. The human mind is such that it cannot absorb pure data. Data become information only when they are looked at through the spectacles of an idea. The constant interplay between information we collect and data that have been organized by the old ideas. To improve those

3:55 AM  
Blogger saswati said...

You seem to be doing a great job. Let us know how ordinary citizens can help out in combating terrorism.

Best wishes

Saswati Sarkar

5:17 PM  

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